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Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.
Excerpt from ‘Jabberwocky’, in Carroll
(1871), emphasis mine.
The poem excerpted in the epigraph has often been called a ‘nonsense poem’. After all:
what does it mean? What is a slithy tove? What does it mean to be brillig or mimsy? Calling
it nonsense, however, overlooks the amount of meaning we can extract from the emphasized
words: minimally, a scene in the past is being described, which took place somewhere called
a ‘wabe’. The emphasized words are what are known as function words : they provide the
‘grammatical glue’ among the content words, which are indeed nonsense in this excerpt.
The distinction between these two types of expression occupies a central place in modern
theoretical linguistics. Rightfully so: every natural language exhibits a distinction between
function and content words. Yet surprisingly little has been said about the emergence of this
universal architectural feature of natural languages. Why have human languages evolved
to exhibit this division of labor between content and function words? How could such a
distinction have emerged in the first place?
This paper takes steps towards answering these questions by presenting a simple model
of trial-and-error language learning in which a division of signals into function and content
words emerges. In the next section, I briefly but more explicitly introduce the distinction.
In Section 2, I argue that a necessary condition for the emergence of the distinction is
the presence of non-trivial composition. I present three case studies in which only trivial
composition emerges and a mathematical result that diagnoses why that is the case. In
Section 3, I introduce a new type of signaling game – the Extremity Game – in which
the objects of communication vary from play to play. Amidst such variation, a distinction
between function and content words could be useful. Section 4 reports an experiment, in
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which artificial neural networks are trained by reinforcement learning to communicate in the
Extremity Game. The emerging languages are analyzed, resulting in a system with complex
signals that we can interpret as ‘dimension + -est’. Section 5 concludes.
1 Functional and Lexical Categories
Modern theoretical syntax distinguishes between two broad types of syntactic categories:
lexical and functional.1 The former broadly correspond to the major parts of speech:
nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs. The latter are a bit more varied, but include:2
• Prepositions: ‘in’, ‘above’, ‘from’, ‘to’, . . .
• Determiners: ‘a’, ‘the’, ‘every’, ‘some’, ‘many’, . . .
• Conjunctions: ‘and’, ‘or’, . . .
• Complementizers: ‘that’, ‘if’, ‘whether’, . . .
• Tense:
– Auxiliaries: ‘have’, ‘is’, ‘was’, . . .
– Modals: ‘will’, ‘would’, ‘can’, ‘might’, ‘ought’, . . .
Exactly characterizing the distinction remains tricky. After observing that lexical cate-
gories have ‘contentful’ meaning, while functional categories have ‘grammatical’ meaning,3
it is usually observed that the former constitute open classes and the latter closed classes.
Roughly: one can very readily introduce new nouns and verbs to a language as needed. By
contrast, trying to introduce a new preposition ‘belove’ meaning partially above and partially
below would be quite difficult. Kaplan (1978) famously tried to introduce a new expression
‘dthat’, which rigidly referred to the satisfier of a description. Though he ably demonstrated
the use of such a tool, that it never caught on can be partially attributed to the fact that
demonstratives belong to a closed class. For the purposes of this paper, these distinctions
suffice to point to the intended contrast.
Before proceeding, it’s worth highlighting that the field of semantics – the scientific
study of linguistic meaning – roughly divides itself along the lexical/functional line as well.
The tradition descending from Montague via Partee and many others, usually called formal
semantics, studies specifically compositional semantics. A survey of the textbooks in this
field4 shows that the major expressions studied come exactly from the functional categories.
Lexical semantics – the study of the meanings of basic expressions – studies at length the
meanings of individual expressions and groups thereof in the lexical categories.5 Seen in this
1See, for example, pp. 43-46 of the textbook Carnie (2006).
2This list is incomplete and meant to be illustrative only. There are some debates about exactly which
category certain expressions belong to, but they are orthogonal to present concerns.
3See, e.g., Carnie (2006) and Rizzi and Cinque (2016). Muysken (2008) is a thorough overview of func-
tional categories.
4For example, Heim and Kratzer (1998) and Jacobson (2014).
5See, for example, Levin and Rappaport Hovav (2005).
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light, explaining the emergence of the distinction between functional and lexical categories
occupies a central role in the broader explanation of the emergence of compositionality.
2 Non-Trivial Composition
In this section, I build on the foregoing remarks in order to argue for the following claim: for
a communication system to have function words, there must exist non-trivial composition
(in a sense to be made precise) of complex signals. After presenting this argument, I will
analyze three case studies from the literature on the evolution of compositionality which
exhibit only trivial composition. The reasons for this are then made precise in the form
of a triviality result: given the assumptions about optimal communication often made, the
resulting systems must be trivially compositional.
The principle of compositionality says that the meaning of a complex expression is de-
termined by the meanings of the parts and how they are put together.6 Natural languages
are compositional: whence the ability of competent speakers to produce and comprehend
a potentially infinite set of novel expressions. A language can, however, be compositional
without exhibiting the rich flexibility that human languages do. We will use the following
definition:7
(1) A communication system is trivially compositional just in case complex expressions
are always interpreted by intersection (generalized conjunction) of the meanings of the
parts of the expression.
The force of this definition can be brought out by an example: Titi monkey calls.8
In a series of predator-model experiments, it was found that raptors in the canopy elicit
sequences of A calls, cats on the ground elicit sequences of B calls, cats in the canopy elicit
one A followed by a sequence of Bs, and raptors in the canopy elicit a sequence of As followed
by a sequence of Bs. While the full details do not concern us,9 Schlenker, Chemla, Schel,
et al. (2016a) argue that the best analysis of this call system involves the following semantics,
interacting with some plausible pragmatic principles:
(2) Compositional semantics of Titi alarm calls: where t is a time,
a. JBKt = 1 iff there is a noteworthy event at t
b. JAKt = 1 iff there is a serious non-ground alert at t
c. JwSKt = 1 iff JwKt = 1 and JSKt+1 = 1
[where w is a call and S a sequence of calls]
The crucial feature of this semantics concerns the rule (2c) for interpreting complex ex-
pressions (sequences of calls). It says that a sequence of calls is interpreted by first evaluating
the beginning of the sequence at time t, then evaluating the rest of the sequence at time t+1,
and conjoining the results. This clause results in the following: each call in the sequence
contributes to the meaning of the whole independently of the other calls, with the complete
6Frege (1923), Janssen (1997), Pagin and Westerst˚ahl (2010a), and Pagin and Westerst˚ahl (2010b).
7For this use, see Schlenker, Chemla, Schel, et al. (2016b) and Zuberbu¨hler (2018).
8Ca¨sar et al. (2013) and Schlenker, Chemla, Schel, et al. (2016a).
9See Steinert-Threlkeld (2016b) for some reservations about the full analysis.
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meaning resulting from conjunction. It thus constitutes a paradigm of the definition of trivial
compositionality in (1).10
In other words, non-trivial compositionality involves non-conjunctive modification of one
linguistic item by another. Examples of such systems can also be found in communication
systems much simpler than human language. In particular, Campbell’s monkeys have been
argued to exhibit it.11 They have two basic alarm calls: an eagle call hok and a general
alert krak.12 Moreover, both calls combine with what appears to be a suffix -oo, which has
the effect of weakening the severity of the calls. Schlenker, Chemla, Schel, et al. (2016a)
propose the following semantics:
(3) JR-ooKt = 1 iff at t the sender is alert to a disturbance that licenses R but that is not
strong among such disturbances.
This is non-trivial: -oo does not contribute independent meaning that is then conjoined with
the contribution of hok or krak. Rather, it combines with one of the latter calls to modify
the normal meaning of that call.
Here is the simple argument for the claim that non-trivial composition is necessary for the
emergence of function words. Recall the characterization thereof as ‘grammatical glue’: they
precisely do not contribute independent content to a sentence, but structure that provided
by the content words. In a trivially compositional communication system, each expression
contributes independent meaning to the complex expressions containing it. Therefore, none
of the expressions therein are function words.
Before proceeding, we note that the presence of non-trivial composition does not suffice
for the presence of function words. To see this, consider subsective adjectives.13 These are
adjectives like ‘skillful’, which have the property that for every noun, a ‘skillful N’ is an N,
but is not ‘skillful’ in any sense independent from the noun. For example:
(4) a. Jakub is a skillful rock climber.
b. Jakub is a cook.
c. Therefore, Jakub is a skillful cook.
The inference pattern in (4) is not valid: Jakub can be skillful at one thing but not at another.
If ‘skillful’ contributed its meaning independently of the noun it combines with, the inference
would be valid: Jakub would be a climber, a cook, and skillful; therefore, a skillful cook.
But ‘skillful’ is still a content word. One could imagine a very simple language whose only
complex expressions were of the form ‘Adj N’, but which had subsective adjectives. This
language would be non-trivially compositional but would have no function words.
Now, I will present three case studies of prominent models purporting to explain aspects
of the evolution of compositional communication. Each of them, however, will turn out
to exhibit only trivial composition. After presenting the case studies, I identify common
underlying assumptions and then prove a mathematical fact demonstrating that under those
10Berthet et al. (2018) argue that the proper semantics for Titi calls is not in fact trivially compositional.
Nevertheless, the presentation just given illustrates what such a system would look like.
11Ouattara, Lemasson, and Zuberbu¨hler (2009) and Schlenker, Chemla, Arnold, et al. (2014).
12The possibly different meaning of krak in different habitats of Campbell’s monkeys is the subject of the
aforementioned papers. We follow Schlenker, Chemla, Schel, et al. (2016a) in giving it a general meaning.
13Partee (1995).
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assumptions, the resulting communication systems must be trivially compositional. In light
of the foregoing, none of these extant approaches can explain the emergence of the distinction
between function and content words.
2.1 Three E´tudes
Nowak and Krakauer (1999) apply mathematical models of natural selection to the evo-
lution of language, providing conditions under which a ‘grammatical’ language will evolve
from a non-compositional one. In their model, states are object-action pairs, loosely model-
ing events. They compare two types of languages: one in which each object-action pair has
an independent label, and another in which each object has a corresponding expression, each
action has a corresponding expression, and the agents communicate by sending the corre-
sponding pair of expressions to communicate about an object-action pair. While the results
they obtain are indeed interesting, it should be clear from this brief exposition that the type
of language that they consider exhibits only trivial composition: each component of a com-
plex expression contributes its bit of meaning (either an object or an action) independently
of the other.
Barrett (2007) and Barrett (2009) studies a generalization of signaling games14 with
multiple senders. In the simplest case, there are four states of nature and two sender, each
of whom can send one of two signals to the receiver. The senders, but not the receivers, know
which state obtains. Simulations show that a simple form of reinforcement learning leads
these agents to a situation of perfect communication. Given the nature of the setup, the
resulting systems look as follows. One sender partitions the four states into two sets of two,
one for each signal. The other sender sends its two signals in an orthogonal partition.15 One
can imagine the states as a two-by-two square, with one sender indicating the row and the
other the column of the true state. Such a system again exhibits only trivial composition,
since the meaning of each sender’s signal is independent of the other’s and the receiver
interprets the sequence by intersecting the two.
Finally, Mordatch and Abbeel (2018) study the emergence of communication in a multi-
agent setting where each agent has a private goal that it wants to achieve.16 The agents –
which are in this case recurrent neural networks – communicate about a world with various
colored landmarks in it. Each agent additionally has a color and no agents share a reference
frame. The goals consist of getting an agent to perform an action (going to or looking at) at
one of the landmarks. With appropriate costs for maintaining large lexicons, the agents learn
to send sequences of signals with separate signals for which agent, which action, and which
landmark. These three types of signals have independent meanings, which are combined by
conjunction.
2.2 A Limitative Result
There is in fact an underlying reason that these systems exhibit only trivial composition.
Although the three cases just illustrated come from different theoretical frameworks, they
14Lewis (1969) and Skyrms (2010).
15See, e.g., Lewis (1988).
16The set of goals is assumed to be consistent, i.e. all of the goals are simultaneously realizable.
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all share the same following assumptions:
(A1) Agents communicate about a fixed set of states. (Object/action pairs, separate points
of a state space, and agent/landmark/action tuples, respectively.)
(A2) Optimal communication consists in correctly identifying the true member of the state
space.
(A3) Messages are fixed-length sequences of signals from fixed sets.
It turns out that under these assumptions, there’s a mathematical sense in which optimal
communication will be trivially compositional. This is captured in the following result:
(5) Let X and {Mi}i∈I be any sets, and f, g two functions of the following type:
X
f−→
∏
i
Mi
g−→ X
Define f−1i (
−→m) := {x ∈ X : f(x)i = −→mi}. Then the following holds.
If g ◦ f = idX , then for all −→m, {g (−→m)} =
⋂
i
f−1i (
−→m) 17
Here, X represents the fixed set of states about which the agents communicate. Note
that the structure of this set does not matter.
∏
iMi is the set of possible sequences of
signals, with each Mi being the signals available to be sent in position i of a sequence. f is
a sender function: a function from states to sequences of signals. This can capture a single
sender, or multiple acting either independently or in concert. g is a receiver function: it
decodes the sequence of signals to one of the states X. Because idX is the identity function
on X, mapping each point to itself, that g ◦ f = idX means that optimal communication has
been achieved, in the sense that the receiver always recovers the true state from X. Under
that assumption, the result says that the receiver interprets a complex message (a sequence)
by intersecting the independent meanings of each signal in the sequence (represented by
f−1i (
−→m)).
This result identifies three assumptions that cannot all be maintained if one wants to
model the emergence of non-trivial composition, which I have just argued is a necessary step
for explaining the emergence of function words. Not every approach makes all three of these
assumptions. In particular, my own past work18 as well as Barrett, Skyrms, and Cochran
(2018) drop (A3). In these models, not every message is a sequence of the same length. In
the former, one sender can choose whether or not to prefix a set of signals with an additional
signal. In the latter, two senders choose whether or not to send a signal, so messages can be
17Proof: Note first that g must be a surjection and f an injection. Without the former, there would be an
x ∈ X that is not g(−→m) for any −→m, and so g ◦ f 6= idX . Without the latter, distinct points in X would get
mapped to the same point in X by g◦f . Now, suppose there were an −→m such that {g(−→m)} 6= ⋂i f−1i (−→m). This
can hold only if
⋂
i f
−1
i (
−→m) contains more than one element, since g(−→m) has to belong to the intersection.
This entails that there is another point x 6= g(−→m) for which f(x) = −→m, contradicting the injectivity of f .
18Steinert-Threlkeld (2014) and Steinert-Threlkeld (2016a).
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either of length one or two. In either case, the message space is a union, not a product (i.e.
not of the form
∏
iMi for any sets Mi), and so the limitative result does not apply.
In the remainder, I will develop a model which maintains (A2) and (A3) but drops the
assumption (A1) of a fixed set of states that the agents communicate about. That is: the
context in which the agents are communicating will vary. Against that backdrop, there will
be a role for function words to play.
3 A Signaling Game with Varying Contexts
The variant on the signaling game that I will use to illustrate the emergence of function words
will have the agents talking about varying sets of objects with multiple gradable properties.
To get a feel for the kind of task involved, consider the following adaptation of an example
from Graff (2000).19 Suppose that we are both looking at the following two circles, drawn
on top of a table.
For whatever reason, you need me to put something on the left circle. You might say “put
it on the darker circle”. By contrast, suppose that you had the same communicative needs,
but now the circles on the table looked as follows.
Now, to tell me to put it on the left circle, you might say “put it on the lighter circle”, or a
bit more circuitously “put it on the less dark one”.
The target referent of your communication – the circle on the left – has exactly the same
size and shade in both contexts. But in one context, it’s darker than the other circle, while
in the other context, it’s lighter. (For the purposes of illustration, we can assume that you
could not refer to the circles by their spatial position or demonstratively. If you’d like: your
friend is looking at a picture on a screen that may have been scrambled.) Finally, we can
imagine similar situations with more than one gradable property. Suppose, again, that you
need to communicate about the leftmost circle in the following array.
19See Syrett, Kennedy, and Lidz (2010) for a study using similar contexts with children.
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Here, it’s natural to call the leftmost circle “the lightest one”. Now consider the following
context.
Here, you are likely to refer to the circle on the left as “the smallest one”. These situations
have the following structure: in each context, each object has two very salient gradable
properties: a size (radius) and a darkness. These dimensions distinguish the target object:
it has either the largest or the smallest value in one of those dimensions. By drawing
attention to that fact, one can successfully refer to it. Moreover, you can do so in a very
economical way: with labels for the properties and morphemes like the superlative -est (and
its corresponding negative counterpart, ‘the least’), successful communication is ensured.
This is done without talking about specific degrees of size or of lightness and in a way in
which an object with exactly the same degrees on all relevant properties will be referred to
in different ways in different contexts.
I will convert communicative scenarios like the above into a type of signaling game –
called the Extremity Game – with a few helper definitions. Following the literature on
gradable adjectives,20 I will assume that objects have some number of gradable properties,
where each property has a corresponding scale. A scale in turn is a set of degrees, totally
ordered with respect to a dimension. For example, the size of a circle corresponds to its
radius, with degrees being positive real numbers (i.e. R+). For the degree of an object o on
a scale s, I will write s(o). Given a set S of scales, I will define a context as follows.
(6) A context c over scales S is a set of objects such that: for each o ∈ c, there is a scale
s ∈ S such that either o has the least degree on s (o = arg mino′∈c s(o′)) or the highest
degree on s (o = arg maxo′∈c s(o
′)).
At its most general form, the game takes place between a sender and a receiver in the
following way.
(7) Extremity Game, in general:
a. Nature chooses a context c and a target object o ∈ c.
b. The sender sees c and o and sends a message m from some set of messages M .
20See, for instance, Kennedy and McNally (2005) and Kennedy (2007) and the references therein.
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c. The receiver sees c and m and chooses an object o′ from c.
d. The play is successful (and the two agents equally rewarded) if and only if o′ = o.
To fully specify a game, one must say what the messages M available are and how the
agents make their choices. I will specify the former now and the latter in the next section.
The set of available messages will be inspired by the semantics for gradable adjectives. There,
it is assumed that adjectives map objects (of type e) on to their degree on the corresponding
scale (of type d). Morphemes like -est and least then map a contextually specified set of
objects to the subset with the highest and lowest degrees.
(8) Toy semantics for a gradable adjective and superlative morphemes.
a. JsizeK = λx.ssize(x)
b. J-estKc = λP〈e,d〉.λxe.x ∈ c and ∀x′ ∈ c, P (x)  P (x′)
c. JleastKc = λP〈e,d〉.λxe.x ∈ c and ∀x′ ∈ c, P (x)  P (x′)
Now, for the crucial observation: in contexts as defined in (6), having one expression for
each scale and the morphemes -est and least will suffice to uniquely pick out each object in
the context. I will assume, then, that the set of messages M = MS ×MP where MS is a set
of size |S| (i.e. there are as many messages in MS as there are gradable properties for each
object) and MP is a set of size two (P for ‘polarity’). The players of an Extremity Game
will be able to successfully communicate if they can learn to associate each message in MS
with a distinct scale and the two signals in MP with something akin to -est and least. As
advertised, this setup meets two of the three assumptions in the limitative result (5) – (A2)
optimal communication is correct identification of a target object and (A3) messages come
from a product space – but drops (A1): because the context varies from play to play of the
game, there is no fixed set of objects about which the agents communicate.21
4 Experiment
The goal is to show how a simple semantic system like 8 could emerge via a simple dynamics
among agents playing an Extremity Game. In particular, we will use reinforcement learn-
ing :22 agents make choices, receive some reward (in our case, for successful communication
of the target object in context), and adjust their behavior so that they are more likely to
make the corresponding choices in the future.
While most approaches to reinforcement learning in signaling games use a variant of a
simple algorithm called Roth-Erev learning,23 such an algorithm will not suffice for present
purposes. On this approach, choices are reinforced entirely independently of one another.
Two factors of the present setup require a stronger method. On the practical side, there is
a combinatorial explosion that comes from having variable contexts with multiple objects
that have multiple gradable properties: there are so many contexts that most of them will
not be seen often enough for such an algorithm to be effective. On the conceptual side, if
21While the agents in an intuitive sense communicate ‘about’ a fixed set of objects – all objects with |S|
gradable properties – each communicative exchange concerns a different subset thereof.
22Sutton and Barto (2018)
23Roth and Erev (1995)
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choices are reinforced entirely independently, there will be no pressure for signals to emerge
that group objects based on the degrees of various properties and their relative position on
scales in context.
To overcome this limitation, I will use a type of agent with a built-in capacity for stimulus
generalization: artificial neural networks.24 This choice was made because such networks
provide a simple, widely used, and somewhat biologically plausible model that has the ca-
pacity to generalize. Other approaches to stimulus generalization in learning in signaling
games use a method called spill-over.25 In that framework, not only are the actual choices
reinforced, but so too are similar choices in similar states. Exactly how reinforcement works
thus depends on definitions of similarity between choices and between states. While some
domains provide natural such definitions,26 it is not immediately obvious how to define
how similar one context-target pair is to another in an Extremity Game. Neural networks
will learn to treat certain pairs as similar and others not, without the theorist having to
hard-wire a definition of similarity into the learning model.27
4.1 Methods
A trial of our experiment will consist of some number of iterations of playing an Extremity
Game as in (7). The sender and receiver are each neural networks, schematically depicted
in Figure 1. They are trained using the REINFORCE algorithm, the simplest in a family of
methods known as policy gradient methods.28 The intuition behind this algorithm is just as
before. Consider the sender. The sender is a policy that takes as input a context and a target
and outputs a probability distribution over messages (in this case, two distributions: one
over MS and one over MP ). The sender’s policy is parameterized by the weights and biases
that connect the neurons in the network. Thanks to what’s known as the policy gradient
theorem, modern variants of stochastic gradient descent can be used to adjust the weights
and biases in such a way that’s guaranteed to make positively reinforced actions sampled
from the policy more likely in the future.
We varied the number of dimensions (i.e. gradable properties) between 1 and 3, and ran
10 trials for each. We trained for five-, twenty-, and fifty-thousand mini-batches respectively,
where each mini-batch was size 64. In other words, the agents play 64 games in between
each update of their policies; this reduces the variance in learning. We also experimented
with two different neural architectures for the receiver, for reasons that will become clear in
what follows. We recorded the rolling accuracy over 10 training steps, as well as the accuracy
and detailed properties about contexts and signals used on 5000 new games at the end of
training.
24Nielsen (2015) and Goodfellow, Bengio, and Courville (2016)
25See O’Connor (2014). The name ‘spill-over’ comes from Franke (2016).
26For instance, if the goal is to choose a point on a line, the distance between the true point and the
guessed point is very natural.
27See Lazaridou, Peysakhovich, and Baroni (2017) for a similar approach, which inspired the present one.
Their contexts consist of two natural images, one of which is the target. The sender chooses one signal
from a fixed-sized vocabulary to send to the receiver. While they are interested in whether natural concepts
emerge in such a setting, I am focused on less natural input but more complex communication structures in
order to explore the emergence of functional vocabulary.
28Williams (1992). See chapter 13 of Sutton and Barto (2018) for a modern introduction.
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target
ms0 ms1 mp0 mp1
msi
mpj
o0 o1 o2 o3
(a) Basic Sender (b) Basic Receiver
Figure 1: Schematic depictions of basic network architectures. The input is on the bottom,
followed by a sequence of hidden layers to output layers on the top. The output neurons
produce probabilities of choosing the action written above them.
Complete details of the network architectures and training set-up are included in an Ap-
pendix. The code and data can be found at https://github.com/shanest/function-words-context.
4.2 Results: Basic Receiver
The learning curves over training for each trial of each dimension are plotted in Figure 2.
As can be seen, in the one- and two-property cases, the agents learn to communicate nearly
perfectly in a relatively short amount of training steps. By contrast, in the three-dimension
case, the agents do not regularly achieve a high degree of communicative success after 50000
mini-batches. The mean success rates on 5000 new games at the end of training time are
reported in Table 1.
dims mean std
1 0.975 0.006
2 0.985 0.003
3 0.731 0.062
Table 1: Accuracies on
novel games.
In the one-dimensional case, the context consists of two objects
that have a property to different degrees. The successful communi-
cation protocol that the agents learn to use reliably sends one signal
when the target has the lower degree and the other signal when the
target has the higher degree.
In the two-dimensional case, things are not quite as aligned with
expectations. Figure 3 shows a typical communication protocol that
emerges in the two dimensional case. Each column corresponds to
one of the two positions in the sequence of messages. The colored
bars correspond to different messages in each case. On the top row,
we filter the frequency by the true dimension that the target would have in a communication
system like (8); the bottom row is filtered by the true ‘direction’ that the target would have
(i.e. whether it’s the minimum or the maximum in the context on that dimension).
The bottom-left cell shows an interesting pattern: in the first position of the sequence,
the message sent always corresponds to the true direction (minimum or maximum). Un-
fortunately, that the top row shows no such separation implies that no signal is being used
11
Figure 2: Learning curves for basic sender and receiver.
to communicate the ‘true’ dimension. In fact, closer inspection reveals the following: the
learned communication systems are always ‘maximally’ separating in the following sense: for
any two contexts c, c′ and targets o, o′, if o = arg minc sd(o) and o
′ = arg maxc′ sd(o) for the
same dimension d, then the sender’s message for o in c differs from its message for o′ in c′ in
both positions. This holds true for the 3-dimensional case as well. Figure 4 shows an exam-
ple learned system. The bottom-right cell shows that the agents do use MP to distinguish
the true direction of the target. But the top-left cell shows that the agents do not associate
different signals in MS with different dimensions: rather, they separate targets in the way
just described.
These results show that basic senders and receivers do not, under the REINFORCE
algorithm, learn to communicate in accord with the toy semantics in (8). One might think
that one of the messages still looks like a superlative morpheme, since it reliably correlates
with the true direction of the target object. While this is indeed very interesting and does
show that the networks are clustering objects on the basis of their direction (for example,
they never separate on dimension and group together based on direction), given that they
do not use the other signal to communicate the true dimension, it does not look like there’s
non-trivial modification of one linguistic item by another.
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Figure 3: Example communication system with basic receiver and two dimensions.
4.3 Results: Attentional Receiver
Intuitively, the networks are not learning to use a signal to group objects together based on
dimension. This could be for roughly the following reason: in expectation, target objects
that differ only in whether they are the minimum/maximum in context on a dimension will
actually be closer to each other in Euclidean space than to other objects. Because of this,
it could be that the agents use maximally different signals to further differentiate the two
types of target objects.
To help the agents learn to communicate based on the dimension, I will use what is
known as an attention mechanism in machine learning.29 Intuitively, a neural network can
learn to pay more or less attention to different portions of its input. The network (or a
sub-component thereof) computes a weighting of the input positions which is then used to
filter the actual input. The weight can be ‘hard’ – selecting a sub-region of the input – or
‘soft’ – re-weighting the input so that different nodes are more or less attended to than in
the raw input.
Attentional Receivers, as I will develop them, implement a hard attention mechanism in
29See, for instance, Mnih et al. (2014) and Xu et al. (2015).
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Figure 4: Example communication system with basic receiver and three dimensions.
the following sense. First, they receive as input the context c and the message msi from
MS chosen by the sender. On this basis, the receiver chooses a dimension to attend to: the
input is filtered so that the agent only sees the objects according to one dimension (e.g. size
or lightness). Then, the agent uses this attended-to dimension and the message from MP
chosen by the sender to choose a target object. Figure 5 depicts this architecture.
The learning curves over training for each trial of each dimension – but with Basic Senders
and Attentional Receivers – are plotted in Figure 6. The mean success rates on 5000 new
games at the end of training time are reported in Table 2. As before, in the one- and
two-property cases, the agents learn to communicate nearly perfectly in a relatively short
amount of training steps. In all cases, it appears that learning is a bit slower than with
basic receivers. This makes perfect sense: an attentional receiver has to learn two types
of choices to make, as opposed to just one. In the three dimensional case, the attentional
receiver achieves a high-degree of accuracy more frequently than the basic receiver, but also
gets stuck in sub-optimal states more frequently.
The resulting communication protocols behave exactly like the toy semantics in (8).
Figure 7 shows an example protocol in two dimensions. Here, one signal reliably com-
municates the true dimension and another signal reliably communicates the true direction
14
msi
d0 d1
mpj
o0 o1 o2 o3
sample
Figure 5: Attentional Receiver architecture, schematically. The receiver first chooses a di-
mension to attend to, then chooses a target based only on that dimension. In this schematic,
the chosen dimension is size; differences in shading have been washed out by the attention
mechanism.
(largest/smallest degree). Figure 8 shows an example learned communication system in three
dimensions. Again, in complex signals, one signal communicates a dimension, and the other
communicates whether the target has the most or least degree on the corresponding scale.
dims mean std
1 0.959 0.005
2 0.964 0.005
3 0.697 0.144
Table 2: Accuracies on
novel games.
When the agents are communicating in this way, the signals that
communicate direction can be interpreted as function words. The
signals in MS reliably communicate a bit of ‘content’: a dimen-
sion. The signals in MP reliably signal whether the target has the
greatest/lowest degree along that dimension of all the objects in the
context. This is non-trivial modification of one linguistic item by
another. Thus, when the receiver knows to use one of the signals
to attend to a particular dimension in context, the two agents can
learn to use their signals in a non-trivially compositional way.
5 Conclusion
Let us take stock. After introducing the distinction between functional and lexical cate-
gories, I argued that there are in principle reasons why many extant models of the evolution
of compositionality cannot explain the emergence of function words: given their assump-
tions, they can only explain trivial composition; but non-trivial composition is a necessary
precondition for the presence of function words. I then introduced a signaling game with
variable contexts consisting of multiple objects with varying gradable properties. Simple
reinforcement learning by neural networks – in particular with the ability to pay attention
to certain aspects of the input – in this game can generate expressions that are appropriately
characterized as function and as content words.
Much work remains to be done. One would like neural architectures that make fewer
assumptions about what aspects of the input the receiver pays attention to. A first step
15
Figure 6: Learning curves for basic sender and attentional receiver.
in this direction will be to use a soft, as opposed to hard, attention mechanism. A more
thorough hyper-parameter search may also generate more reliable learning results in the
higher-dimensional setting. More generally, one would like communication systems like those
exhibited here to emerge in the very general setting of communicating by a sequence of
symbols with costs for things like vocabulary size and length of messages. One can also
generalize the input so that the networks also have to discover which dimensions are relevant
for being able to successfully refer to objects across contexts, instead of having it built into
the current definition of context. All of these exciting venues remain to be pursued in future
work.
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A Full Experiment Details
For each number of dimensions n, a context has 2n objects. Each object is specified by n
real numbers, chosen uniformly at random from the interval (0, 2) at steps of 0.1. The values
are uniformly subtracted by 1 to center them around 0.
The sender thus has 2n2 input nodes. As a convention, the first object for the sender
is always the target. It has two hidden layers of 64 nodes each, with exponential linear
activation.30 The final hidden layer is then passed through two linear layers, with output
30Clevert, Unterthiner, and Hochreiter (2016)
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sizes |MS| and 2, respectively. These are batch normalized31 and fed into a softmax, to
generate distributions over MS and {ma,mb}.
The basic receiver receives the context, but with the objects in a random order compared
to the sender, and two signals sampled from the sender’s output distributions, encoded as
one-hot vectors. It then has three rectified linear hidden layers of 64, 64, and 32 units
respectively. Then a final linear layer with 2n output nodes (one for each target object) is
passed through batch normalization and softmax to generate a distribution.
The attentional receiver passes the context and a messaged from MS sampled from the
sender through one exponential linear layer of 64 units, before batch normalization and
softmax of size n, one for each dimension. A sample is taken from this distribution. The
corresponding scalar values for each object along the dimension, together with a message
sampled from the sender’s distribution over {ma,mb} are passed through exponential linear
layers of size 64 an 32, before batch normalization and softmax produce a distribution over
target objects.
We trained using the REINFORCE algorithm, with mini-batches of size 64, and the
Adam optimizer32 with learning rate 5 · 10−4. For n = 1, 2, 3 dimensions, and each type of
receiver, we ran 10 trials of 5000, 20000, and 50000 mini-batches of training. After training,
the trained networks then played 5000 versions of the game; the signals chosen, the target
chosen, whether it was correct, and what the ‘true’ dimension and direction (min/max) for
identifying the target in context were recorded.
Everything was implemented in PyTorch. The code and data are available at https:
//github.com/shanest/function-words-context.
31Ioffe and Szegedy (2015)
32Kingma and Ba (2015)
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